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Abstract  Foreign direct investment (FDI) ownership decision is one of the most researched 
topics in the international business literature. However, little is known about the extent to 
which this knowledge can be applied to emerging-economy multinationals. Building on the 
institutional, transaction cost and resource-based view perspectives, this paper analyzes the 
determining factors of FDI mode choice between wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) and joint 
venture (JV) by Chinese firms. From a sample of 139 outward FDI decisions made by large 
Chinese firms between 2002 and 2009, our results show certain characteristics that differ 
from the conventional wisdom of the multinational enterprise (MNE). Host country political 
risk and cultural distance do not affect FDI ownership decisions of Chinese MNEs, while 
firm size is negatively related with WOS. However, from a more conventional point of view, 
technological intensity of the industry is positively associated with WOS. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Entry mode choice is one of the most important decisions in the internationalization process, 
because of its implications for performance and its long-term consequences for the firm. 
Indeed, entry mode decisions have been ranked as the third most researched field in the 
international management literature (Werner, 2002). Predictors of entry mode choice or level 
of equity ownership include host country factors (such as restrictiveness or cultural distance), 
firm-specific factors (such as financial factors, experience or organizational capabilities), 
home country factors, transaction costs, and industry. Numerous empirical studies have 
addressed the entry mode decision and some recent papers have provided a thorough review 
of entry mode research (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Canabal and White, 2008; Morschett, 
Schramm-Klein and Swoboda, 2010; Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). 
For over half a century, internationalization has been associated with western MNEs. 
However, internationalization of firms from emerging economies is on the rise (Yang et al., 
2009). Over the recent years, many Chinese companies have made major investments in other 
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countries. Chinese outward FDI multiplied by four between 2005 and 2009, accounting for 
4.4% of the world’s total (UNCTAD, 2010). It is also estimated that by the end of 2009 there 
were around 13,000 businesses with Chinese capital in 177 countries (MOFCOM, 2010). 
The search for resources (particularly natural resources), markets (in many cases, trying to 
avoid export restrictions) or strategic assets (particularly advanced technology, managerial 
know-how or internationally recognized trademarks) are the main reasons behind such 
growth of Chinese outward FDI (Deng, 2004; Hong and Sun, 2006; Wong and Chan, 2003; 
Wu and Sia, 2002). It is helped by the huge foreign currency reserves accumulated from 
exports, the knowledge acquired by co-operating with foreign companies in China and, of 
course, by the Chinese government, which sees the international expansion of Chinese 
companies as a key element to ensuring the country’s continued economic growth (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Hong and Sun, 2006; Zhang and Van den Bulcke, 1996). 
International business research has not been unaffected by this phenomenon. After an 
initial few years when eminently descriptive works predominated, recent studies have sought 
to explore further into certain specific topics, such as the factors that determine Chinese 
outward FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Kolstad and 
Wiig, 2012; Liang, Lu, and Wang, 2012; Liu, Li, and Xue, 2011; Lu, Liu, and Wang, 2011; 
Luo and Tung, 2007; Quer, Claver, and Rienda, 2012; Rui and Yip, 2008), or the 
applicability of traditional theoretical frameworks (Boisot and Meyer, 2008; Dunning, 2006; 
Liu, Buck, and Shu, 2005; Mathews, 2006; Zhang, Zhou, and Ebbers, 2011). 
However, there are still certain gaps in the literature, and more work is needed to extend 
our knowledge of Chinese MNEs. In particular, we still know very little about the factors that 
influence key strategic decisions in their internationalization process, such as the choice of 
FDI entry modes. Only few papers have addressed this issue so far (Cui and Jiang, 2009a, 
2009b, 2010; Xu, Hu, and Fan, 2011). Therefore, the aim of this paper is to bridge this gap by 
analyzing the influence that various institutional, transaction, and firm-specific factors have 
on FDI ownership decision of Chinese MNEs. From a sample of the largest Chinese 
companies, we study how factors such as political risk, cultural distance, industrial 
technological intensity, firm size and firm international experience affect this decision. In 
doing so, this paper makes a contribution to the international business literature as an 
emerging economy case study. 
First, we present our theoretical framework and establish various hypotheses regarding the 
influence of the above-mentioned factors on FDI ownership decision. We then test these 
hypotheses with firm-level data from a sample of large Chinese companies listed on the 
Fortune Global 500. After a discussion of the results, this paper concludes by suggesting 
future research avenues on this topic. 
 
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
A large number of theories have been used to explain the entry mode choice decision. We 
build on three of the most commonly applied theories: institutional theory, internalization 
theory and the resource-based view (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007).  
 
2.1 Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional theory makes it possible to establish solid grounds to explain the 
internationalization of companies from emerging economies entering other emerging 
economies and the markets of more developed countries alike (Wright et al., 2005). In the 
first case, it is more likely that they are seeking to exploit their assets, which may be more 
easily applicable in an environment with similar institutional characteristics to those found in 
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the country of origin. Indeed, when competing in these emerging countries, companies from 
emerging economies may have lower transaction and co-ordination costs than companies 
from developed economies do. On the other hand, companies from emerging economies tend 
to enter developed economies looking to explore assets in order to acquire new technological 
capabilities that will allow them to be more competitive in the global market. 
Institutional differences are particularly important for MNEs operating in more than one 
institutional context (Meyer et al., 2009). The formal and informal rules affect not only how a 
company chooses to enter an economy, but the very decision on whether or not to set up in a 
particular country as well as the entry mode. According to the institutional theory, companies 
make their strategic choices based on interaction between institutions and the organization 
itself, and attempt to obtain institutional legitimacy in terms of the host country’s rules and 
regulations (Cui and Jiang, 2010). Institutional factors alter the cost of doing business in one 
nation rather than another, which affects every aspect of the MNE’s behaviour (Henisz and 
Swaminathan, 2008): choosing the location, technology, capital or staff, as well as organizing 
the local subsidiary or investment sequence. From an institutional perspective, the choice of 
an entry mode is a result of the organization’s responses to isomorphic pressures arising from 
both firm’s external environment and internal organizational practices and routines (Ge and 
Ding, 2009). 
Host country political risk is one of the most researched institutional factors in the entry 
mode literature. Political risk can be considered as an external influence that affects the 
company’s operations, whether that means the possibility of expropriation or nationalization 
of the investment, or other government actions or changes in the political and social situation 
that could have a negative effect on economic activity (Kobrin, 1979; Simon, 1984). 
The conventional wisdom suggests that higher political risk will be negatively associated 
with entry modes involving full ownership, this being the relationship that has traditionally 
received the greatest empirical support (Azofra and Martínez, 1999; Brouthers, 2002; 
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Luo, 2001; Pak and Park, 2004). 
Faced with conditions of political instability and uncertainty, foreign enterprises will be 
reluctant to commit many resources through FDIs. In addition, when the political risk is high, 
the firm must find a flexible position that allows it to modify its decisions if environment 
conditions change, and even to leave the country without incurring substantial losses. For this 
reason, the firm will prefer non-ownership-based or low investment modes. Finally, to enter a 
high-risk country successfully, the firm may need the help of a local partner that can provide 
it with access to knowledge about the target country, thus sharing the risk. In view of these 
arguments, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: Host country political risk is negatively related to the likelihood that Chinese 
firms will choose WOS entry mode. 
 
Cultural distance is another traditional factor in the literature on entry mode choice. Culture 
can be considered part of the environment’s informal institutions, which underpin formal 
institutions (Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008). Some arguments support the view that greater 
cultural distance will be associated with the adoption of an entry mode that implies lower 
resource commitment. Cultural distance may generate additional costs related to information 
collection and disturb communication processes, which require a common ground in order to 
code and decode the information (Pak and Park, 2004). Consequently, being less familiar 
with the target country makes integration more difficult and increases internalization costs, 
which is why the enterprise will prefer a lower resource commitment level (Randoy and 
Dibrell, 2002). On the other hand, it can be considered, as we previously pointed out in 
relation to political risk, that low ownership modes which improve the firm’s flexibility to 
move away from the target market if it does not succeed in becoming acclimatized to an 
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unfamiliar location (Kim and Hwang, 1992). Additionally, the greater cultural distance may 
force the firm to look for local support with the aim of facilitating product adaptation, sharing 
risks and avoiding mistakes (Azofra and Martínez, 1999; Chen and Hu, 2002), and also to 
acquire management skills on a local level and even to delegate culturally sensitive tasks 
(Contractor and Kundu, 1998; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Pak and Park, 2004). Finally, when 
it comes to exploiting a competitive advantage, the firm must take into account the specific 
context knowledge, that is, the peculiar way to do business in a specific country. Thus, 
cultural distance hinders the applicability of the firm’s own routines, which is why the firm 
may prefer entry modes based on collaboration with local agents (Madhok, 1997). 
Therefore, all the above would lead us to expect an inverse relationship between cultural 
distance and WOS entry modes. Nonetheless, there are also arguments that question this 
hypothesis. Cultural distance may not only make it difficult to find an appropriate local 
partner, but also generate costs when transferring know-how to that partner. This is why the 
firm will probably prefer high-ownership entry modes (Contractor and Kundu, 1998). 
Moreover, the little familiarity with the host country’s culture and with local managers gives 
investors incentives to choose WOSs so that subsidiaries can be more efficiently controlled 
(Chen and Hu, 2002). Therefore, a positive relationship between cultural distance and full-
ownership could be also expected.  
As a result, the predicted effect of cultural distance on entry mode choice is ambiguous 
(Morschett et al., 2010). Indeed, Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell (2005), after a meta-analysis 
from 66 independent samples, failed to provide statistical evidence of significant 
relationships between cultural distance and entry mode choice. Hence, their conclusion is that 
cultural distance is not directly related to entry mode choice. As a result, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 2: Cultural distance is not related to the likelihood that Chinese firms will choose 
WOS entry mode. 
 
2.2 Internalization Theory 
 
Internalization theory, building on transaction cost economics, suggests that high ownership 
is more likely when the transaction involves products and processes with high proprietary 
content that may suffer from potential free-riding problems. These assets are difficult to 
transfer in an imperfect market. The high transaction costs of transferring proprietary assets 
incurred by companies lead them to internalize markets (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Buckley and Casson, 1976; 1998; Hill and Kim, 1988; Rugman, 1981). 
Market transactions involving technological know-how imply costs (specifying the 
agreement conditions, the likelihood of disclosing key knowledge, the difficulty to codify 
such knowledge, etc.) which may constitute a clear incentive for FDI (Teece, 1986). Such 
entry mode proves more efficient when transferring tacit or non-codifiable knowledge 
enjoying little legal protection (Hennart, 1989). Furthermore, to safeguard specific assets 
from potential opportunism problems, firms may use high control governance structures, such 
as WOSs (Tahir and Larimo, 2004). 
Kumar (1984) argued that firms operating in sectors with a high technological intensity 
may be expected to use entry modes allowing them a more efficient control of all the tasks to 
be carried out in the host country. Similarly, Chen and Hu (2002) observed that WOSs were 
more likely than contractual JVs when the foreign firm belonged to a high-technology 
industry. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3: The technological intensity of the industry is positively related to the 
likelihood that Chinese firms will choose WOS entry mode. 
 
2.3 Resource-Based View 
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The resource-based view suggests that firms develop unique resources that they can exploit in 
emerging markets or use foreign markets as a source for acquiring or developing new 
resource-advantages (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). The resource-based view is compatible 
with traditional MNE theory. In fact, Dunning (1988) suggests that ownership factors relate 
to the MNE’s ability to compete in foreign markets and that these advantages derive from 
unique country, industry, and firm-specific variables. Thus, ownership advantages are 
conceptually similar to firm-specific resources, in that they are the unique internal factors that 
generate competitive advantages (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Tallman, 1994). 
One of the most influential ownership advantages is firm size. Larger firms may be in a 
better position to successfully compete with host country firms, especially in host countries, 
and absorb the high costs and risks in international operations (Pangarkar and Yuan, 2009). 
Besides, greater size implies greater availability of financial and managerial resources, which 
makes it easier to set up WOSs (Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). In keeping with this, 
empirical research supports that firm size correlates positively with high-commitment entry 
modes (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2003; Campa and 
Guillén, 1999; Rialp, Axinn and Thach, 2002; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Trevino and Grosse, 
2002; Yu, 1990). Thus, we propose that,  
Hypothesis 4: Firm size is positively related to the likelihood that Chinese firms will choose 
WOS entry mode. 
 
Another influential ownership advantage related to FDI is the firm’s international experience. 
Experience-based knowledge plays an outstanding role in the internationalization process 
(Eriksson et al., 1997). Indeed, this is one of the basic tenets of the Uppsala Model (Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). This approach underlines 
that, as firms progressively gain experience, they tend to decide on more committed 
strategies. If the firm has already been involved in FDIs in several countries, the firm will 
have accumulated capabilities and know-how concerning such a mode of entry, which may 
be used in other destinations and even, allows the firm to bypass intermediate stages (Welch 
and Luostarinen, 1988). 
Furthermore, firms with more FDIs also possess a higher level of accumulated distinctive 
competencies, which allow them to overcome what Zaheer (1995) called “the liability of 
foreignness”, i.e. the additional costs incurred by firms operating in foreign markets. Various 
empirical studies have identified a positive relationship between the scope of a firm’s 
international operation (number of FDIs in different countries) and high-commitment entry 
modes (Contractor and Kundu, 1998; Randoy and Dibrell, 2002). As a result, we propose 
that: 
Hypothesis 5: Firm international experience is positively related to the likelihood that 
Chinese firms will choose WOS entry mode. 
 
3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
 
The sample for this study is made up of all the outward FDIs made from 2002 to 2009 by the 
mainland Chinese companies listed on the Fortune Global 500. The year 2002 was chosen 
because it was when Chinese companies first started to conduct important international 
operations. This followed a major boost in 2001 when China joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and particularly when the Chinese government announced its “go out” 
policy, which aimed to boost the international competitiveness of Chinese companies by 
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reducing the obstacles to outward FDI. Since then, the Chinese government has continued to 
provide incentives for the process, as it considers that forming large MNEs will help China to 
become a key player in the global economy. Helping Chinese companies get onto the Fortune 
Global 500 list has thus become an objective in itself (Hong and Sun, 2006).  
Chinese companies listed on Fortune Global 500 provide and appropriate research setting 
because they have made some of the China’s biggest overseas investments to date. For 
instance, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec)’s acquisition of Addax 
Petroleum, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)’s partial acquisition of the 
Standard Bank of South Africa, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)’s takeover of 
Petrokazakhstan or Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC division. 
Overall, 35 different mainland Chinese firms were listed on the Fortune Global 500 
between 2005 and 2009. The data on each FDI were obtained from news items published on 
the website of China Daily (www.chinadaily.com.cn), the largest English-language 
newspaper in China. Having searched all news items covering international operations by 
each of the 35 firms between January 2002 and December 2009, we obtained 139 FDI 
ownership decisions, these being the sample for our study. Table 1 provides descriptive data 
on our sample. 
 
Table 1 Sample Descriptive Data 
 
Firm 
Global 500 
rank (2009) 
Revenues  
($ millions) 
Outward 
FDIs 
(2002–2009) 
Sinopec 中国石化 9 207,814 11 
CNPC 中国石油天然气集团公司 13 181,123 22 
State Grid 国家电网 15 164,136 2 
ICBC 中国工商银行 92 70,568 10 
China Mobile 中国移动通信 99 65,015 2 
China Construction Bank 中国建设银行 125 57,977 4 
China Life Insurance Company 中国人寿保险 133 54,534 1 
Bank of China 中国银行 145 51,317 8 
Agricultural Bank of China 中国农业银行 155 48,063 0 
Sinochem 中国中化集团公司 170 44,457 5 
China Southern Power Grid 中国南方电网 185 41,083 0 
Baosteel 上海宝钢集团公司 220 35,517 4 
China Railway Engineering Corp. 中国铁路工程
总公司 
242 33,758 1 
China Railway Construction 中国铁建 252 32,538 1 
China Telecom 中国电信 263 31,814 6 
CSCEC 中国建筑工程总公司 292 29,807 2 
CNOOC 中国海洋石油总公司 318 28,027 9 
COSCO 中远集团 327 27,430 3 
China Minmetals 中国五矿集团公司 331 26,667 6 
COFCO 中粮 335 26,446 1 
China Communications Construction中国交通建
设 
341 25,983 0 
SAIC 上海汽车工业(集团)总公司 359 24,882 4 
Sinosteel 中国中钢集团公司 372 24,164 7 
Hebei Iron and Steel Group河北钢铁集团 375 24,034 0 
China Metallurgical Group 中国冶金科工集团公 380 23,767 4 
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司 
China FAW Group 第一汽车集团 385 23,664 2 
CITIC Group 中国中信集团公司 415 22,229 3 
China Unicom 中国联通 419 21,981 3 
China Huaneng Group  425 21,781 2 
Aviation Industry of China  426 21,738 0 
China South Industries Group  428 21,675 0 
Jiangsu Shagang Group  444 20,897 2 
Bank of Communications  494 18,677 1 
Chinalco  499 18,579 5 
Lenovo    499* 16,788 8 
 Total outward FDIs 139 
 * Global 500 Rank (2008) 
 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in this study represents the dichotomous choice of FDI entry mode 
between a WOS (including both greenfield and full acquisition) and a JV. We adopt 
Brouthers and Hennart (2007) position that JVs are joint hierarchies and that they include 
both shared greenfields and partial acquisitions. 
 
3.3 Independent Variables 
 
Based on Buckley et al. (2007), host country political risk was proxied by the political risk 
rating of the International Country Risk Guide (PRS, 2010). This rating assigns risk points to 
a pre-set group of factors, termed political risk components. In every case the lower the risk 
point total, the higher the risk, and the higher the risk point total the lower the risk. In order to 
take into account institutional differences, we calculated a political risk distance by 
subtracting the target market risk value from the home market value (Brouthers, Brouthers, 
and Werner, 2008). 
Cultural distance was measured by the Kogut and Singh (1988) index, based on Hofstede’s 
cultural dimension scores (Hofstede, 1980). This index has been extensively used in previous 
literature on entry mode choice (Chen and Hu, 2002; Contractor and Kundu, 1998; Hennart 
and Larimo, 1998; Luo, 2001; Pak and Park, 2004; Xu, Hu and Fan, 2009, 2011). 
We proxied the technological intensity of the industry by classifying the industries of the 
companies into various technology levels (Chen and Hu, 2002; Chen, Hu, and Hu, 2002; 
Claver and Quer, 2005; Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Hu and Chen, 1993; Pangarkar 
and Yuan, 2009; Tahir and Larimo, 2004). We used the OECD proposal (2001) which, based 
on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC-revision 3) establishes four 
categories in manufacturing sectors and two categories in service sectors. Thus, we classified 
the sectors in our sample into three categories: (1) low technology manufacturing sectors and 
services not based on know-how; (2) medium-low and medium-high technology 
manufacturing sectors; (3) high technology manufacturing sectors and knowledge-based 
services. 
Firm size was measured by total sales (Campa and Guillén, 1999; Contractor and Kundu, 
1998; Pangarkar and Yuan, 2009; Randoy and Dibrell, 2002; Tahir and Larimo, 2004). 
International experience was proxied by the number of FDIs the firm had carried out in other 
countries at the time of entry (Randoy and Dibrell 2002; Tahir and Larimo, 2004). We used a 
log transformation of these two variables. 
 
3.4 Control Variables 
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By using data from the UN Statistics Division (2010), we considered a control variable 
regarding host-market size (proxied by host-country GDP). We used log transformation to 
normalize the distribution of this measure (Buckley et al., 2007). Finally, we included a 
dummy variable regarding the objective of each outward FDI decision: 1 if resource-seeking, 
and 0 otherwise. The FDI decision was classified into the resource-seeking category if the 
investing company belonged to a mining-quarrying industry and its aim was to access a local 
resource, usually in a country rich in raw materials. 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
 
To test the above hypotheses we conducted a binary logistic regression. It is a statistical 
model that makes it possible to estimate the effect of an increment of each independent 
variable on how likely the dependent variable (entry mode) is to take value 1 (WOS) as 
opposed to value 0 (JV). 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. Before conducting the 
regression analysis, we performed a multicolinearity diagnosis, examining the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) for all the variables. This test measures the extent to which the 
variances of the coefficients estimated in a regression are inflated when compared to the 
cases in which the independent variables are not linearly related. High VIF values can 
become indicators of the existence of multicolinearity. The highest VIF was 2.25, which is 
well below 10, the cut-off point recommended by Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1985). This 
allows us to rule out the presence of multicolinearity in our data. 
Table 3 shows the regression analysis results. As can be seen, we used two models. Model 
1 performs the regression of the dependent variable on the control variables. Model 2 also 
includes independent variables relating to the hypotheses1. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean SD VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Host market size 5.49 0.88 1.75       
2. Resource-seeking   
    objective 
0.55 0.50 1.74 –0.45      
3. Political risk 4.08 
13.7
0 
2.25 0.56 
–
0.33 
    
4. Cultural  distance 1.93 1.18 2.05 0.56 
–
0.16 
0.67    
5. Industry technological     
    intensity 
2.36 0.54 1.30 0.19 
–
0.53 
0.18 0.03   
6. Firm size 4.60 0.34 1.75 –0.28 0.32 
–
0.30 
–
0.15 
–0.22  
7. International 
experience 
0.81 0.34 1.73 –0.20 0.36 
–
0.25 
–
0.13 
–0.17 0.63 
Note:  1.Correlations above 0.17 are significant at 0.05 level. 
2.Correlations above 0.22 are significant with at 0.01 level. 
3. Significance levels are based on two-tailed test. 
 
Table 3 Binary Logistic Regression Results 
                                                 
1  Because large-sized firms may go international earlier and accumulate sufficient international 
experience, we controlled for the possible redundancy of these two independent variables: firm size 
and international experience. Thus, we performed the regression by alternatively removing each 
variable. However, in doing so, we did not find any significant improvement in coefficients. 
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Dependent variables Model 1 Model 2 
Host market size (control)  0.07 (0.05)   0.47 (0.34) 
Resource-seeking objective (control)    –1.76*** (0.39)     –0.99† (0.58) 
Political risk (Hypothesis 1)     0.03 (0.03) 
Cultural distance (Hypothesis 2)     0.23 (0.28) 
Industry technological intensity 
(Hypothesis 3) 
       0.93* (0.47) 
Firm size (Hypothesis 4)       –1.46** (0.52) 
International experience (Hypothesis 
5) 
    1.28 (0.91) 
Overall chi-square 32.52*** 53.77*** 
Overall % correct 72.1% 81.4% 
–2 Log likelihood 136.61 109.81 
Nagelkerke R2 0.31 0.49 
Note: 1.The dependent variable is WOS (= 1) or JV (= 0). 
2.† indicates p < 0.1; * indicates p < 0.05; ** indicates p < 0.01; *** indicates p < 0.001. 
3. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The regression equation in Model 1 is statistically significant (Chi-Square = 32.52, p < 0.001), 
which suggests that control variables explain entry mode choice. More precisely, the 
resource-seeking objective has a negative impact on the choice of a WOS (β = –1.76, p < 
0.001). This effect is maintained when the explanatory variables are included, although with 
lower statistical significance (Model 2). The regression equation in Model 2 is also 
statistically significant (Chi-Square = 53.77, p < 0.001), and the independent variables 
explain 81.4% of the entry modes selected. 
Our results show that political risk is not related with WOS entry mode. Thus, H1 is not 
supported. This goes against some findings of previous studies on MNEs from other countries 
—particularly developed countries—which reported a negative relationship. Thus, our 
finding contradicts this conventional influence of political risk on entry mode choice. 
Although Xu, Hu and Fan (2009) reported that the smaller the host country political risk is, 
the larger ownership percentage the Chinese firm will choose, other studies did not find a 
significant relationship between political risk and FDI decisions of Chinese firms. Therefore, 
empirical evidence exists in line with our result, suggesting that the risks of the host country 
do not affect Chinese MNEs in a conventional way. Cui and Jiang (2009a) found that country 
risk did not have a significant impact on FDI entry mode of Chinese firms, whereas Buckley 
et al. (2007) did not confirm that Chinese outward FDI was negatively associated with high 
levels of political risk in the host country. 
Chinese MNEs show certain characteristics that challenge the conventional view that 
political risk is negatively related to full-ownership entry modes. Although many Chinese 
companies do not have asset advantages such as technology and branding, they do have a 
transaction advantage: the ability to manage relationships within a complex environment such 
as China. This gives them an edge over MNEs from developed countries when it comes to 
investing in markets with these institutional characteristics (Malhotra and Zhu, 2009; Morck, 
Yeung and Zhao, 2008). Similarity in the institutional environments of two countries may 
allow for the management to organize an internal market more effectively than in two 
countries with highly differentiated institutional environments (Henisz, 2003).  
The very idiosyncrasy of China’s own institutional framework may provide some 
additional arguments (Buckley et al., 2007). Because of imperfections in the Chinese capital 
market, the cost of capital is very low for state-owned Chinese companies. Furthermore, 
because they are conditioned by the institutional influences of the Chinese government, they 
may not be behaving purely as profit maximizers. Moreover, an important part of the Chinese 
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outward FDI has been directed at countries with which China has close political and 
ideological ties, many of which have a high political risk. 
Furthermore, many of the Chinese FDIs included in our sample belong to regulated 
industries such as oil and gas, banking, telecommunications or utilities. Overall, these 
regulated industries share three characteristics (Henisz, 2003): the central role of government 
as either a provider or a monitor; the need for foreign capital, which forces host country 
governments to open the sector to private participation; and institutional idiosyncrasies that 
hamper credit assessment by international financial institutions and investors’ ability to hedge 
their exposure using financial instruments. These conditions create the potential for MNEs to 
generate rents through the management of their relationships with the government. 
Recent research on the international expansion of firms in regulated industries challenges 
the notion that countries with high levels of policy instability are unattractive to foreign firms 
(García-Canal and Guillén, 2008). While the foreign firm would prefer a constrained 
executive branch during the operational phase of the investment, that is, a government or 
regulator that cannot easily change the rules of the game, at the time of entry the foreign firm 
would prefer to deal with a politically unconstrained executive branch in the host country so 
as to obtain preferential treatment. In such institutional environments, firms may develop 
broader meta-level routines both to identify the institutional idiosyncrasies and to lobby or 
influence the actors who can best prevent an adverse policy change or promote a favourable 
policy change (Henisz, 2003). Therefore, the Chinese firm would be in a better position to 
impose its preference for a WOS, if it considers it the most appropriate entry mode in order to 
control foreign operations (Taylor, Zou, and Osland, 2000). 
Regarding cultural distance, the regression results show that it is not related to the 
likelihood that Chinese firms will choose WOS entry mode, thus supporting H2. This finding 
goes against observations made by Cui and Jiang (2009a, 2009b, 2010) and Xu, Hu and Fan 
(2011) who found that cultural barriers had a negative impact on a Chinese firm’s choice of 
WOS entry mode. When developing this hypothesis, we offered arguments regarding both a 
positive and a negative influence of cultural distance on the choice of a WOS. In addition, it 
must be pointed out that the influence of cultural distance may depend on the Chinese firm’s 
objectives. While investments that sought markets might well have been initially aimed at 
countries in which this distance was smaller, investments that seek know-how have been 
mainly aimed at developed countries in North America and Europe, which are culturally 
more distant (Young, Huang and McDermott, 1996). Also, many Chinese companies do not 
seem to shy away from cultural distance, perhaps aided by the alliances they have made in 
China with MNEs from developed countries (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
We find support for H3, as the positive relationship between the technological intensity of 
the industry and the likelihood of a WOS entry mode is significant (β = 0.93, p < 0.05). Thus, 
following the conventional wisdom of the internalization theory, Chinese firms belonging to 
high-technology industries seem to use high control entry modes in order to avoid 
opportunism problems. This finding is in line with the case study of Cui and Jiang (2009b), 
who reported that the level of asset specificity and the possibility of partner opportunism are 
positively related to the likelihood that the Chinese firm will choose WOS entry mode. They 
also argued that these transaction costs were contingent on the industry and product 
characteristics of the Chinese firm. 
Contrary to expectation, our results show that firm size does have a significant negative 
impact on WOS (β = -1.46, p < 0.01). Thus, H4 is rejected. This contradicts the result of Cui 
and Jiang (2009a) who found that firm size showed a positive impact on the choice of WOS 
entry mode by Chinese firms. However, there is also empirical evidence suggesting that firm 
size has no effect on the decision by Chinese firms to engage in outward FDI (Lau, Ngo and 
Yiu, 2010). It should be pointed out that there are some arguments suggesting that size, as a 
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strategic factor, is not necessarily correlated to the propensity to use high-ownership entry 
modes (Contractor and Kundu, 1998). This supports the conclusion of Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988) that “higher control modes are less likely for large foreign operations”. This 
argument is based on the idea that the size of global operations in many industries will force 
even large firms to accept partners to share in the large total investment and large coverage of 
a global network. In other words, the path to becoming a global player could require Chinese 
firms to accept a lot of partners and use shared-ownership entry modes. 
The positive effect of firm international experience on WOS entry mode is not significant, 
which does not support H5. Types of international experience may provide some explanation 
for this result. Firm prior experience associated with a specific entry mode may be more 
influential than general international experience. However, lack of data prevented us from 
including this kind of specific experience in our model. In addition, Chinese companies, 
compared to their Western counterparts, could not require to go abroad to gain experience, 
since many of them gain international experience at home. Forming JVs with foreign firms, 
entering into a partnership with them through original equipment manufacturing or licensing 
their technology, is a route chosen by many Chinese companies (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
This kind of inbound internationalization is one of the distinctive characteristics of the 
internationalization process of Chinese firms, providing them with competencies and 
knowledge relevant to eventual outbound internationalization. Inbound internationalization is 
attractive for local firms, because learning from their foreign partners contributes to increase 
their competitiveness (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). 
Finally, we briefly discuss the significant control variable. The resource-seeking objective 
reveals a negative impact on the choice of WOS entry mode (β = –0.99, p < 0.1). As pointed 
out above, the search for resources, particularly natural resources, has been one of the 
traditional objectives of Chinese outward FDI. Depending on what the objective is for 
Chinese companies, the institutional factors linked to each location may play a very different 
role. For example, institutional restrictions that may arise when a Chinese company makes a 
FDI to access a resource considered strategic for the host country may not be applied when 
FDI is made in that same country for the purpose of accessing its market. For this reason, 
although the sole ownership would give the Chinese investing firm unrestricted access to 
resources, host country government restrictions may prevent them from using a WOS. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Compared to inward FDI in emerging markets, outward FDI from these emerging economies 
is a relatively new area of international business research. Despite the recent rise of Chinese 
outward FDI and the extensive research on entry mode choice, FDI ownership decision of 
Chinese firms remains an under-explored topic. The aim of this study was to fill this gap by 
analyzing some institutional, transaction and firm-specific factors affecting that decision. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on entry mode choice of emerging economy firms in 
several ways. To our knowledge, along with the papers of Cui and Jiang (2009a, 2009b, 2010) 
and Xu, Hu and Fan (2011), this is one of the first attempts to analyze the determinants of 
FDI mode choice of Chinese firms. Thus, building on the institution, transaction, and 
resource-based views, our paper suggests that there are both similarities and differences 
between Chinese MNEs and traditional MNEs from developed countries. 
From a transaction cost perspective, our results highlight the importance of the 
technological intensity of the industry as a determining factor of Chinese firms´ choice of 
WOS entry modes. High transaction costs of transferring technological know-how is the 
traditional argument for such relationship. 
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However, other findings from our paper seem to go against the conventional logic that has 
been observed in entry mode decisions made by MNEs from other, particularly Western, 
countries. A high political risk in the host country, do not act as disincentive for Chinese 
MNEs to choose WOSs instead of JVs. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that cultural 
distance is an important institutional barrier for Chinese companies. In addition, from a 
resource-based perspective, firm size shows an unexpected negative impact on WOS, while 
general international experience seems not to affect FDI entry mode choice of Chinese firms. 
Our findings also have several implications for practitioners. This paper provides Chinese 
managers with a framework to make decisions on FDI ownership choice. Although 
traditional host country institutional obstacles for Western MNEs seem not to influence that 
choice in the case of Chinese firms, managers must be aware that their choice could be 
constrained by industry’s technological intensity and they need to realize that the objective of 
the FDI also matters. Therefore, industry characteristics as well as firm objectives are key 
considerations for entry mode decision-making process of Chinese MNEs. 
This research, though, is not without limitations. First, our empirical research is based on 
secondary data, a fact that influences the measurement of the variables. This prevented us 
from including managerial perceptions as well as other variables that might affect entry mode 
decisions, such as firm marketing capabilities or its experience with a specific entry mode. 
These limitations suggest avenues for future research. First, future studies could achieve a 
more in-depth understanding of FDI ownership choices of Chinese firms by detailed surveys 
on managerial decision-making processes, including perceptions on institutional, transaction 
and firm-specific factors. Future work can also examine the interrelationship between entry 
mode choice (full vs. shared ownership) and establishment mode (greenfield vs acquisition), 
analyzing whether they are sequential or simultaneous decisions. It might also be interesting 
to analyze the influence of the different FDI ownership modes on the performance of Chinese 
firms, depending on whether the choice conforms or not to the theoretical models. 
Finally, future research may also wish to focus on the interaction between target country 
institutional features and resources, including moderating effects (Brouthers et al., 2008; 
Meyer et al., 2009). As some resource-based advantages are context specific, differences in 
nations’ institutional environments may influence the applicability of such advantages. Thus, 
including other firm-specific resources not considered here and adding the moderating 
influence of national institutional environment to the resource-based view could help to better 
explain entry mode choice of Chinese MNEs. 
 
References 
 
Agarwal, S., & Ramaswami, S. N. 1992. Choice of foreign market entry mode: Impact of 
ownership, location and internalization factors. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 23(1): 1–27. 
Anderson, E., & Gatignon, H. 1986. Modes of foreign entry: A transaction cost analysis and 
propositions. Journal of International Business Studies, 17(3): 1–26. 
Azofra, V., & Martínez, A. 1999. Transactions costs and bargaining power: Entry mode 
choice in foreign markets. Multinational Business Review, 7(1): 62–75. 
Boisot, M., & Meyer, M.W. 2008. Which way through the open door? Reflections on the 
internationalization of Chinese firms. Management and Organization Review, 4(3): 
349–365. 
Brouthers, K.D. 2002. Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode 
choice and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2): 203–221. 
Brouthers, K.D., & Hennart, J.F. 2007. Boundaries of the firm: Insights from international 
entry mode research. Journal of Management, 33(3): 395–425. 
  13 
Brouthers, K.D., Brouthers, L.E., & Werner, S. 2003. Transaction cost-enhanced entry mode 
choices and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 24(12): 1239–1248. 
Brouthers, K.D., Brouthers, L.E., & Werner, S. 2008. Resource-based advantages in an 
international context. Journal of Management, 34(2): 189–217. 
Buckley, P, J., Clegg, L.J., Cross, A.R., Liu, X., Voss, H., & Zheng, P. 2007. The 
determinants of Chinese foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 38(4): 499–518. 
Buckley, P.J., & Casson, M. 1976. The future of the multinational enterprise. The MacMillan 
Press, London.  
Buckley, P.J., & Casson, M. 1998. Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: Extending the 
internalization approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 29(3): 539–562. 
Campa, J.M., & Guillén, M.F. 1999. The internalization of exports: Firm- and location-
specific factors in a middle-income country. Management Science, 45(11): 1463–1478. 
Canabal, A., & White, G.O. 2008. Entry mode research: Past and Future. International 
Business Review, 17(3): 267–284. 
Chen, H., & Hu, M.Y. 2002. An analysis of entry mode and its impact on performance. 
International Business Review, 11(2): 193–210. 
Chen, H., Hu, M.Y., & Hu, P.S. 2002. Ownership strategy of multinationals from ASEAN: 
The case of their investment in Sino-foreign joint ventures. Management International 
Review, 42(3): 309–326. 
Child, J., & Rodrigues, S.B. 2005. The internationalization of Chinese firms: A case for 
theoretical extension? Management and Organization Review, 1(3): 381–410. 
Claver, E., & Quer, D. 2005. Choice of market entry mode in China: The influence of firm-
specific factors. Journal of General Management, 30(3): 51–70. 
Contractor, F.J., & Kundu, S.K. 1998. Modal choice in a world of alliances: Analyzing 
organizational forms in the international hotel sector. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 29(2): 325–358. 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. 2009a. FDI entry mode choice of Chinese firms: A strategic behaviour 
perspective. Journal of World Business, 44(4): 434–444. 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. 2009b. Ownership decisions in Chinese outward FDI: An integrated 
research framework and research agenda. Asian Business & Management, 8(3): 301–
324. 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. 2010. Behind ownership decision of Chinese outward FDI: Resources 
and institutions. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4): 751–774. 
Deng, P. 2004. Outward investment by Chinese MNCs: Motivations and implications. 
Business Horizons, 47(3): 8–16. 
Deng, P. 2009. Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international 
expansion? Journal of World Business, 44(1): 74–84. 
Dikova, D., & Van Witteloostuijn, A. 2007. Foreign direct investment mode choice: Entry 
and establishment modes in transition economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 38(6): 1013–1033. 
Dunning, J.H. 1988. The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement and 
some possible extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1): 1–32. 
Dunning, J.H. 2006. Comment on Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century 
globalization. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23(2): 139–141. 
Eriksson, K., Johanson, J., Majkgard, A., & Sharma, D.D. 1997. Experiential knowledge and 
cost in the internationalization process. Journal of International Business Studies, 28(2): 
337–360. 
  14 
Fladmoe-Lindquist, K., & Tallman, S. 1994. Resource-based strategy and competitive 
advantage among multinationals. In P. Shrivastava, A. Huff and J. Dutton (Eds.), 
Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 10, Part A, 45–72, Jai Press Inc. 
García-Canal, E., & Guillén, M.F. 2008. Risk and the strategy of foreign location choice in 
regulated industries. Strategic Management Journal, 29(10): 1097–1115. 
Gatignon, H., & Anderson, E. 1988. The multinational corporation´s degree of control over 
foreign subsidiaries: an empirical test of a transaction cost explanation. Journal of Law 
Economics and Organization, 4(2): 305–336. 
Ge, G.L., & Ding, D.Z. 2009. The effects of the institutional environment on the 
internationalization of Chinese firms. In I. Alon et al. (Eds.), China rules. Globalization 
and Political Transformation, 46-68, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, UK. 
Henisz, W., & Swaminathan, A. 2008. Institutions and international business. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 39(4): 537–539. 
Henisz, W.J. 2003. The power of the Buckley and Casson thesis: The ability to manage 
institutional idiosyncrasies. Journal of International Business Studies, 34(2): 173–184. 
Hennart, J.F. 1989. Can the ‘new forms of investment’ substitute for the ‘old forms’? A 
transaction costs perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 20(2): 211–234. 
Hennart, J.F., & Larimo, J. 1998. The impact of culture on the strategy of multinational 
enterprises: Does national origin affect ownership decisions. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 29(3): 515–538. 
Hill, C.W., & Kim, W.C. 1988. Searching for a dynamic theory of the multinational 
enterprise: A transaction cost model. Strategic Management Journal, 9(special issue): 
93–104. 
Hofstede, G. 1980. Culture’s Consequences. International Differences in Work-Related 
Values. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA. 
Hong, E., & Sun, L. 2006. Dynamics of internationalization and outward investment: Chinese 
corporations´ strategies. The China Quarterly, 187: 610–634. 
Hu, M.Y., & Chen, H. 1993. Foreign ownership in Chinese joint ventures: A transaction cost 
analysis. Journal of Business Research, 26(fall): 149–160. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.E. 1977. The internationalization process of the firm. A model of 
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 8(1): 23–32. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.E. 1990. The mechanism of internationalization. International 
Marketing Review, 7(4): 11–24. 
Johanson, J., & Wiedersheim-Paul, F. 1975. The internationalization of the firm. Four 
Swedish cases. Journal of Management Studies, October: 305–322. 
Kim, W.C., & Hwang, P. 1992. Global strategy and multinationals´ entry mode choice. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 23(1): 29–53. 
Kobrin, S.J. 1979. Political risk: A review and reconsideration. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 10(1): 67–80. 
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 19(3): 411–432.  
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. 2012. What determines Chinese outward FDI? Journal of World 
Business, forthcoming. 
Kumar, N. 1984. Growth, Acquisition and Investment. An Analysis of the Growth of 
Industrial Firms and their Overseas Activities. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,.  
Lau, C.M., Ngo, H.Y., & Yiu, D.W. 2010. Internationalization and organizational resources 
of Chinese firms. Chinese Management Studies, 4(3): 258–272. 
  15 
Liang, X., Lu, X., & Wang, L. 2012. Outward internationalization of private enterprises in 
China: The effect of competitive advantages and disadvantages compared to home 
market rivals. Journal of World Business, forthcoming. 
Liu, X., Buck, T., & Shu, C. 2005. Chinese economic development, the next stage: Outward 
FDI?. International Business Review, 14(1): 97–115. 
Liu, Y., Li, Y., & Xue, J. 2011. Ownership, strategic orientation and internationalization in 
emerging markets. Journal of World Business, 46(3): 381–393. 
Lu, J., Liu, X., & Wang, H. 2011. Motives for outward FDI of Chinese private firms: Firm 
resources, industry dynamics, and government policies. Management and Organization 
Review, 7(2): 223–248. 
Luo, Y. 2001. Determinants of entry in an emerging economy: A multilevel approach. 
Journal of Management Studies, 38(3): 443–472. 
Luo, Y., & Tung, R.L. 2007. International expansion of emerging market enterprises: A 
springboard perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 481–498. 
Madhok, A. 1997. Cost, value and foreign market entry mode: The transaction and the firm. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18(1): 39–61. 
Malhotra, S., & Zhu, P.C. 2009. Determinants and valuation impact of cross-border 
acquisitions by firms from China and India. AIB 2009 Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 
June 27–30. 
Mathews, J.A. 2006. Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century globalization. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 23(1): 5–27. 
Meyer, K.E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S.K., & Peng, M.W. 2009. Institutions, resources, and 
entry strategies in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 30(1): 61–80. 
MOFCOM 2010. 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China´s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Department of Outward Investment and 
Economic Cooperation, Beijing, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn. 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Zhao, M. 2008. Perspectives on China’s outward foreign direct 
investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3): 337–350. 
Morschett, D., Schramm-Klein, H., & Swoboda, B. 2010. Decades of research on market 
entry modes: What do we really know about external antecedents of entry mode 
choice?. Journal of International Management, 16(1): 60–77. 
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M.H. 1985. Applied Linear Statistical Models: 
Regression, Analysis of Variance and Experimental Designs. 2nd edition. Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., Homewood. 
OECD 2001. Science, Technology and Industry Scorecard 2001. OECD, Paris, France.  
Pak, Y.S., & Park, Y.R. 2004. Global ownership strategy of Japanese multinational 
enterprises: A test of internalization theory. Management International Review, 44(1): 
3–21. 
Pangarkar, N., & Yuan, L. 2009. Location in internationalization strategy: Determinants and 
consequences. Multinational Business Review, 17(2): 37–68. 
Peng, M.W., Wang, D.Y.L., & Jiang, Y. 2008. An institution-based view of international 
business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 39(5): 920–936. 
PRS, 2010. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The Political Risk Services Group. 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ 
Quer, D., Claver, E., & Rienda, L. 2012. Political risk, cultural distance, and outward foreign 
direct investment: Empirical evidence from large Chinese firms. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, forthcoming. 
Randoy, T., & Dibrell, C.C. 2002. How and why Norwegian MNCs commit resources abroad: 
Beyond choice of entry mode. Management International Review, 42(2): 119–140. 
  16 
Rialp, A., Axinn, C., & Thach, S. 2002. Exploring channel internalization among Spanish 
exporters. International Marketing Review, 19(2): 133–155. 
Rugman, A.M. 1981. Inside the Multinationals. The Economics of Internal Markets, New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Rui, H., &Yip, G.S. 2008. Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic intent 
perspective. Journal of World Business, 43(2): 213–226. 
Simon, J.D. 1984. A theoretical perspective on political risk. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 15(3): 123–143. 
Stopford, J.M., & Wells, L.T. 1972. Managing the Multinational Enterprise. Organization of 
the Firm and Ownership of the Subsidiaries, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York. 
Tahir, R., & Larimo, J. 2004. Understanding the ownership structure choices of Finnish firms 
in Asian countries. European Business Review, 16(5): 494–510. 
Tallman, S., & Fladmoe-Lindquist, K. 2002. Internationalization, globalization, and 
capability-based strategy. California Management Review, 45(1): 116–135. 
Taylor, C.R., Zou, S., & Osland, G.E. 2000. Foreign market entry strategies of Japanese 
MNCs. International Marketing Review, 17(2): 146–163. 
Teece, D.J. 1986. Transactions cost economics and the multinational enterprise. An 
assessment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7: 21–45.  
Tihanyi, L., Griffith, D.A., & Russell, C.J. 2005. The effect of cultural distance on entry 
mode choice, international diversification and MNE performance: a meta-analysis. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 36(3): 270–283. 
Trevino, L.J., & Grosse, R. 2002. An analysis of firm-specific resources and foreign direct 
investment in the United States. International Business Review, 11(4): 431–452. 
UN Statistics Division, 2010. National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, United Nations 
Statistics Division, http://unstats.un.org/ 
UNCTAD, 2010. World Investment Report 2010. Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva. 
Wan, W.P., & Hoskisson, R.E. 2003. Home country environments, corporate diversification 
strategies, and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 46(1): 27–45. 
Welch, L.S., & Luostarinen, R. 1988. Internationalization: evolution of a concept. Journal of 
General Management, 14(2): 34–55. 
Werner, S. 2002. Recent developments in international management research: A review of 20 
top management journals. Journal of Management, 28(3): 277–305. 
Wong, J., & Chan, S. 2003. China’s outward direct investment: Expanding worldwide. China: 
An International Journal, 1(2): 273–301. 
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R.E., & Peng, M.W. 2005. Strategy research in 
emerging economies: Challenging the conventional wisdom. Journal of Management 
Studies, 42(1): 1–33. 
Wu, F., & Sia, Y.H. 2002. China´s rising investment in Southeast Asia: Trends and outlook. 
Journal of Asian Business, 18(2): 41–61. 
Xu, Y., Hu, S., & Fan, X. 2009. The impacts of country risk and cultural distance on 
transnational equity investments. Empirical evidence of Chinese enterprises´ 
shareholdings in overseas listed companies. Chinese Management Studies, 3(3): 235–
248. 
Xu, Y., Hu, S., & Fan, X. 2011. Entry mode choice of Chinese enterprises: The impacts of 
country risk, cultural distance and their interactions. Frontiers of Business Research in 
China, 5(1): 63-78. 
Yang, X., Jiang, Y., Kang, R., & Ke, Y. 2009. A comparative analysis of the 
internationalization of Chinese and Japanese firms. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 26(1): 141–162. 
  17 
Young, S., Huang, C.H., & McDermott, M. 1996. Internationalization and competitive catch-
up processes: Case study evidence on Chinese multinational enterprises. Management 
International Review, 36(4): 295–314. 
Yu, C-M.J. 1990. The experience effect and foreign direct investment. Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, 126(4):  561–580. 
Zaheer, S. 1995. Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management Journal, 
38(2): 341–363. 
Zhang, H.Y., & Van den Bulcke, D. 1996. International management strategies of Chinese 
multinational firms. In J. Child and Y. Lu (Eds.), Management Issues in China in the 
1990s: International Enterprises, 141–164, London:Routledge. 
Zhang, J., Zhou, C., & Ebbers, H. 2011. Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: 
Institutional perspectives and evidence. International Business Review, 20(2): 226–238. 
Zhao, H., Luo, Y., & Suh, T. 2004. Transaction cost determinants and ownership-based entry 
mode choice: A Meta-analytical review. Journal of International Business Studies, 
35(6): 524–544. 
